电商平台优惠券最优分配策略：充足还是稀缺？,International Journal of Production Economics

随着数字经济的发展，平台主导的优惠券正成为越来越流行的营销方式。如何优化设计优惠券策略，实现商户与平台的协调，成为平台供应链管理的关键。本文研究了一个平台主导的优惠券发放问题，分析了平台和商家的最优策略：优惠券成本谁承担、发放多少优惠券。我们提出了一个 Stackelberg 游戏，其中平台充当领导者并决定优惠券面额。然后，商家作为跟随者，决定产品的售价。根据消费频率的异质性，将消费者分为高频消费者和低频消费者。我们分析表明，当平台承担成本时，在最高面额和最高产品售价的共同作用下，平台与商家可以在供应充足的策略下实现优惠券合作，即优惠券数量可以满足所有消费者的购物频率。当商家承担成本时，平台仍然倾向于发放更多优惠券。但商家将因优惠券费用带来的损失而蒙受损失。为了达成优惠券合作，平台可以通过调整优惠券面额来放弃对商家的过度剥削。当商家承担成本时，平台仍然倾向于发放更多优惠券。但商家将因优惠券费用带来的损失而蒙受损失。为了达成优惠券合作，平台可以通过调整优惠券面额来放弃对商家的过度剥削。当商家承担成本时，平台仍然倾向于发放更多优惠券。但商家将因优惠券费用带来的损失而蒙受损失。为了达成优惠券合作，平台可以通过调整优惠券面额来放弃对商家的过度剥削。

"点击查看英文标题和摘要"

With the growth of the digital economy, platform-led coupons are becoming an increasingly popular marketing approach. How to optimally design coupon strategies to achieve the coordination between the product merchant and platform has become critical in platform supply chain management. This paper studies a platform-led coupon distribution problem and analyzes the optimal strategies of the platform and merchant: who bears the coupon cost and how many coupons should be offered. We propose a Stackelberg game in which the platform acts as the leader and decides the coupon denomination. Then, the merchant, as the follower, decides the product's selling price. Consumers are divided into high-frequency and low-frequency consumers according to their heterogeneity in consumption frequency. Our analysis shows that when the platform bears the cost, under the combined effect of the highest denomination and the highest product selling price, the platform and the merchant can realize coupon cooperation under the supply-adequate strategy, which means the number of coupons can satisfy the shopping frequency of all consumers. When the merchant bears the cost, the platform still tends to distribute more coupons. However, the merchant will suffer due to the losses caused by the coupon costs. To reach coupon cooperation, the platform can give up the excessive exploitation of the merchant by adjusting the coupon denomination.