《纯粹理性批判》英文版 读书笔记 1.1.1论空间

By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. In space their form, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable.

outer sense：外感官

本节要开始讨论空间了，开篇即提出外感官的概念，外感官能够将对象表象为外在的，即在空间中的，而在空间中就意味着它的性状和大小是确定的。

Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object;10 yet it is still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time.

Inner sense：内感官

与外感官对应的就有内感官，这是一种表象心灵自身的能力，与外感官不同的是它不能将心灵直观为一个具体的对象，但是它使得内在体验被表象为时间，所以内感官依然是一种确定的形式。

康德要讨论纯粹直观，他认为纯粹直观包含了两种最基本的表象，即空间和时间，它们分别是外在世界的形式和内心世界的形式。这里需要重点理解，很多人直觉性地认为空间和时间是外在于心灵的，客观世界的固有属性，事实上这也是康德那个时代许多哲学家的看法。但是康德的认识论所要做的第一件事就是将这种关系倒转过来，“人为自然界立法”的思想就是从人的认识能力本身出发认识世界而不预设任何外在的本体论架构。这是康德的创举，也是他的整个哲学的核心思想。

Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us.

时间不能被我们直观为外在的某物就像空间不能被内在直观一样。

Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities? Are they only determinations or relations of things, yet ones that would pertain to them even if they were not intuited, or are they relations that only attach to the form of intuition alone, and thus to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to any thing at all?In order to instruct ourselves about this, we will consider space first.

康德正式发出提问，空间和时间到底是什么。这里他列举了两种可能：determinations of things还是attach to the form of intuition alone，即它们到底是依附于物体的还是依附于心灵的。接下来进行空间的先验阐明。

1)Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation.

康德首先说明了一个关键问题，即空间不是来自外部经验，相反它是外部经验的前提。“将它们表象为彼此分开的，在不同地方的”这样一种表象能力本身就是空间感的体现，这意味着要想将外部世界感知为空间，必须首先拥有这样一种能力，那么这个能力显然不能来自外界。

2)Space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of all outer intuitions.[A 29] One can never represent that there is no space, although one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.

上一段说空间不是什么，这一段就说它是什么。

举了一个例子：一个人可以想像空间中没有任何物体，但是不能想像没有空间本身。这意味着空间似乎是人的表象能力得以存在的必要条件而非一个依赖于它的规定。

3)The apodictic certainty of all geometrical principles and the possibility of their a priori construction are grounded in this a priori necessity. For if this representation of space were a concept acquired a posteriori, which was drawn out of general outer experience, the first principles of mathematical determination would be nothing but perceptions. They would therefore have all the contingency of perception, and it would not even be necessary that only one straight line lie between two points, but experience would merely always teach that. What is borrowed from experience always has only comparative universality, namely through induction. One would therefore only be able to say that as far as has been observed to date, no space has been found that has more than three dimensions.

apodictic：无可置疑的

contingency ：偶然性

perception：知觉

所有几何定理的无可置疑的确定性和它们的先验构建的可能性都是建立在这种先验的必然性之上的。因为如果这种空间表象是一个从一般的外部经验获得的后天概念，那么数学形式的最初的定理就只能是知觉了。它们因此就会具有知觉的一切偶然性。从经验借来的东西总是只有比较意义上的普遍性，也就是归纳。一个人只能够说就目前所观测的来看，没有三维空间被发现。

从另一个角度说明为什么认为空间是先验的。空间的直观体现之一就是几何定理，几何定理的确定性和知觉的偶然性是矛盾的。人从经验中学到的东西至多是归纳得出的，而没有一种先天的确定性。“最初的定理”其实就是数学中的“公理”，这里也举了一个“两点之间只有一条线段”这样一个公理的例子。这种公理是没办法由其它定理推导得到的，因此要么是经验的归纳要么是表象能力的先天形式。显然，这里康德认为是后者。

4)Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition.[A 25] For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only thought in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations. From this it follows that in respect to it an a priori intuition (which is not empirical) grounds all concepts of them. Thus also all geometrical principles, e.g., that in a triangle two sides together are always greater than the third, are never derived from general concepts of line and triangle, but rather are derived from intuition and indeed derived a priori with apodictic certainty.

discursive：推论的，论证的(区别于intuitive)

essentially ：本质上

空间不是一个推论的概念或一般事物的普遍概念，而是一个纯直观。因为首先，一个人只能表象一个单一的空间，如果一个人提到许多空间的说法，它只是把它理解为那唯一的空间的许多部分。并且这些部分也不是能够先于这个唯一空间的，而必须在这个唯一的空间中才能思考它们。空间本质上是唯一的，它的杂多，也就是空间的一般概念，都是有限制的。由此得出，一种先天直观是关于空间的所有概念的基础。因此所有几何定理不是从普遍概念而是从直观，实际上也就是先验的确定性推导而来。

5)Space is represented as a given infinite magnitude. A general concept of space (which is common to a foot as well as an ell) can determine nothing in respect to magnitude. If there were not boundlessness in the progress of intuition, no concept of relations could bring with it a principle of their infinity.